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ing-off points for the study of human behavior, including collective human behavior. Here, we come at the problem in a slightly
different fashion. We ask whether models of collective human behavior have anything to offer those who study animal behavior.
Our brief example of tipping points, a model first developed in the physical sciences and later used in the social sciences, suggests
that the analysis of human collective behavior does indeed have considerable to offer [Current Zoology 58 (2): 298306, 2012].
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Animal behavior is one arena where social learning,
defined as learning by observing or interacting with
others (Heyes, 1994) as opposed to learning individually,
is studied in its most uncomplicated form (e.g., Laland,
2004; Couzin et al., 2005). Nevertheless, groups of
animals in which individuals learn from and respond to
other individuals are still complex systems. For example,
in flocks of birds or schools of fish, it takes only a small
fraction of individual learners to impart a coherent direction to the entire group, as the majority copies the
travel direction of neighbors (Couzin et al., 2005).
Flocks gain their coherent directionality through averaging the individual perceptions of each bird.
By studying the collective behavior of animals, the
dynamics of these systems can be observed and manipulated clearly enough to often lend insight into the
core of much more complex dynamics of human societies and groups (Laland and Reader, 2010). The relative
simplicity of rules by which animals interact can help us
see through the fog of complicated factors that pervade
human social behavior. What about the reverse? Can
studies of collective human behavior tell us anything
important about animal behavior?
As an example we focus on a single issue, tipping
points in human (and mechanical) systems. Although its
origin lies in the sociology of the 1950s, the term “tipping point” has risen dramatically in popularity only in
the last decade, catalyzed by Gladwell’s (2000) bestselling book, and now regularly used in studies of such
topics as climate change (Russill and Nyssa, 2009) and
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finance (Scheffer et al., 2009).

1 Scaling Up
Although care needs to be taken in scaling up observations on flocks of birds or schools of fish to human
groups, they provide potentially profound hypotheses
about collective decisions in human groups, in that the
most persuasive or influential property may not necessarily be logical superiority in skill or status—increased
working memory, ability to delay gratification, and the
like—but rather the persistence of the message, a strategy of which opinion leaders and marketers make explicit use. This effect may arise from the network rather
than from a special individual. Highly clustered social
networks, for example, appear to favor the spread both
of norms of cooperation (Ohtsuki et al., 2006) and of
innovations by introducing them repeatedly to individuals through different neighbors of a cluster (Helbing and
Yu, 2009; Centola, 2010; Lorenz et al., 2011).
Studies of collective animal behavior can also tell us
something about the so-called “wisdom of crowds”
(Suroweicki, 2004). A group of animals migrates long
distances through lots of “noisy” directional cues that
are smoothed out and integrated across the group,
through social learning among individuals. Similarly,
experiments in psychology have shown that a group of
people with average intelligence can brainstorm better
and plan their activities more effectively than “smarter”
individuals (Wooley et al., 2010).
Studies of animal behavior not only provide data
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relative to the averaged behavior of large groups, they
also highlight the presence of abrupt changes. For flocks
of birds, for example, false alarms can spread and amplify across a flock through bad information (Couzin et
al., 2005). Hence, in both human and animal groups, the
element of individual thinking and accurate information
is critical (Bentley and O’Brien, 2011). Even simple
forms of animal social learning give a group higherorder computational capacities to respond to its environment (Couzin, 2007).

Given the leap in cognitive ability that humans possess, are human models applicable to the study of animals? Multiple animal species are able to learn (Laland
and Reader, 2010), but only groups of humans—more
accurate and complex social imitators than any other
animals—can substantially accumulate socially learned
information over generations. Humans continue to
“learn things from others, improve those things, transmit them to the next generation, where they are improved again, and so on,” and this process continues to
lead to the “rapid cultural evolution of superbly designed adaptations to particular environments” (Boyd
and Richerson, 2005: 4, emphasis in original). Human
cultural transmission is thus characterized by the
so-called “ratchet effect,” in which modifications and
improvements stay in the population until further
changes ratchet things up again (Tomasello et al., 1993;
Tennie et al., 2009).
The question is, if collective human behavior is so
complex that it far outstrips the processes and components that scaffold animal behavior, perhaps the application of the former to the later is analytically naive. We
reject this proposition on two grounds. First, a vast
amount of research has shown that the collective behavior of many animals—birds, ants, locusts, Morman
beetles, and hundreds of other taxa (e.g., Couzin et al.,
2005; Buhl et al., 2006; Bode et al., 2010; Eriksson et
al., 2010; Katz et al., 2011)—are as varied and as complicated as any collective behaviors exhibited by humans. Second, and perhaps counterintuitively, many
models of collective human behavior—stock-market
activity, for example—make undemanding assumptions
about human intelligence and in fact have been termed
“zero-intelligence” models (Farmer et al., 2005). Although zero-intelligence models in finance are concerned with how traders arrive at prices for equities, the
central mechanism is the same as the new breed of
models of flocking and herding: agents copy the actions

of other agents with a certain degree of error. This combination of transmission and error should sound familiar,
as it reflects two of the three elements of the evolutionnary process, inheritance and variation. This is why
these simple models are so powerful.
It appears that sociological models may have informed zoological models in terms of how a consensus
or preference forms. Palfrey and Poole (1987), for example, modeled “voters” as varying in how well informed they were about political candidates. Starting
with a bimodal distribution of voter preference, they
found that adding uninformed agents increased the tendency for the consensus to regress to a single mode.
Uninformed individuals effectively diluted the influence
of those who were better informed. Similarly, Couzin
and colleagues (2011) considered the role of neutrality,
or ignorance, among group members in achieving group
consensus. As they show, it is possible for group consensus to be controlled by a small but determined minority that has much stronger preferences than the majority. In addition, the transition from the majority-rules
state to the minority-rules state occurs in tipping-point
fashion. A rapid transition occurs between dynamic
phases as the strength of preferences in the informed
minority is increased and/or the fraction of uninformed
members of the population is increased (to a point).
Using as an analogy flocks or schools, each agent is
assigned a direction vector, and the strength of its preference (directionality) is captured by the magnitude of
that vector. The only other rules are that each agent
aligns with the direction of travel of its neighbors and
avoids collisions. Couzin and colleagues supposed there
are two subpopulations—a majority traveling by following direction vector w1 and a minority following
direction vector w2. The group normally follows the
majority direction except as w2 is made greater than w1,
whereupon the group suddenly directs itself in the minority direction (Fig. 1a). These results were nicely confirmed by controlled experiments with fish (golden
shiners Notemigonus crysoleucas) trained to prefer a
blue or a yellow target destination and then released in
different proportions from the tank side opposite those
target destinations (Couzin et al., 2011).
A second version of Couzin and colleagues’ model is
a binary-choice model that is effectively equivalent to
the socio-ecological models of Watts (2002) and
Haldane and May (2010), which we will describe in the
next section. Couzin and colleagues set agents within a
fixed network and allowed them to adopt, probabilistically, the choice they perceived to be the majority in
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Tipping points in the collective behavior model of Couzin et al. (2011)

As the directional preference of the minority (w2) is made greater than the preference of the majority (w1), the group suddenly directs itself in the
minority direction (left-handed). As the density of uninformed individuals is increased, the consensus abruptly shifts from minority to majority
(right-handed).

their local network. Each agent also had its own level of
“intransigence” during interactions, equivalent to the
social-conformity thresholds explored by Watts (2002).
The result was again a sharp tipping point from minority- to majority-controlled outcome. As Fig. 1b shows,
as the density of uninformed individuals is increased,
the consensus abruptly shifts from minority to majority,
as uninformed individuals inhibit the influence from the
strongly opinionated minority (Couzin et al. 2011). This
resembles tipping points studied in social sciences.

3

Tipping Points

Prior to the study of Couzin and colleagues, tipping
points in group dynamics have also been observed and
modeled in the behaviors and interactions of social insects, for example (Beekman et al. 2001; Theraulaz et al.
2002; Amé et al. 2006). Perhaps because language affects how science is practiced (Griffiths and Steyvers,
2004; Evans and Foster, 2011), there is a resurgence in
the academic study of tipping points, especially as they
relate to the social sciences. The value of this body of
research for animal scientists lies in the complexsystems approach—a value that is increasingly being
realized through studies that treat human systems and
ecological systems interchangeably (e.g., Dyer et al.,
2009; Saavedra et al., 2009; Haldane and May, 2011).
Generally speaking, the fundamental question is how,
through a change in one system parameter, an abrupt
change occurs in another measure that describes the
state of the system. Parameters and changes can take
many forms, and in some cases it is easy to see the potential link to collective animal systems. Schelling
(1971), for example, ostensibly was concerned with

ethnic segregation, but the crucial parameter in his
model was the threshold that modeled agents had for
different neighbors, the critical value of which segregated the modeled population.
Another classic tipping-point parameter is the average number of network connections per agent at which a
random network becomes a giant interconnected cluster
(Erdős and Rényi, 1960). Similarly, a tipping point
might describe a bifurcation in the behavior of an iterated equation (Brock and Hommes, 1997), such as the
classic logistic map xt+1 = Axt(1-xt), which, as A is increased from 3.0 to 4.0, becomes chaotic, such that each
result is never repeated in subsequent iterations.
Although highly instructive, rarely are the parameters
of these models measurable or realistic enough for tipping points to be predicted in the world of interacting
animals. Typically what are measured are the characteristics of a time series of a single system variable (e.g.,
Scheffer et al., 2009) or the coordination of nontemporal
factors such as the interconnectedness of the system and
the propensity for each of its individual agents to move
or change (e.g., Haldane and May, 2011). Given the
cost-benefit limits on predictability (Goldstein and Seheult, 2008), such measurable characteristics can be
subject to certain simple tools for evaluating tipping
points, through tests of quantitative time-series data and
qualitative interaction. These are termed “threshold assessments.”

4

Time Series: Simple Tricks

The record of the past is our best view into the future,
and in the science of behavior we are often presented
with a time series of events, from abundances of fossil
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from the rough analogy, tools used for financial data
have successfully been applied to animal-behavior data.
One example concerned the data on animal group size
collected by Hill and Dunbar (2003), which struck the
interest of researchers who analyze financial time series
in detail. The study (Zhou et al., 2005) revealed the hierarchical nature of animal social groups in that the
group-size data showed a modularity such that each new
order of group size was three times larger than the previous one. Those animals happened to be humans, and
the data concerned their networks of holiday cards sent
to each other (Hill and Dunbar, 2003), but the insight
about the hidden hierarchical organization then led, by
way of a similar discovery about hunter–gatherers
(Hamilton et al., 2007), to essentially the same realization about hierarchical groupings of baboons, orcas, and
elephants (Hill et al., 2008). In other words, the social
study of humans, combined with insights from a geophysicist and an expert on financial time series, produced new insights into animal behavior.

5 System Interconnections and
Thresholds
Ideally, time-series analysis would be complemented
by a quantitative, or even a qualitative, assessment of
the configuration of the different parts and their interactions. Network science is an increasingly popular approach, but for many dynamical systems the actual interconnections, especially brief encounters between
animals, are ephemeral or so numerous as to be uncountable. In comparison, an ecosystem model may
offer significant new insights into the dynamics, particularly where uncertainty is high. For example, after
demonstrating that climate change would disrupt entire
networks of bird populations across Sub-Saharan Africa,
Hole and colleagues (2009) advocated increasing the
number and size of protected areas, restoring critical
habitat types, and active monitoring. These recommendations resemble those offered for business in an uncertain environment, which include increasing the number
of bets made in the market and continual monitoring
and feedback (Watts and Hasker, 2006).
Bringing insights from ecology into finance, Haldane
and May (2011) used a well-researched ecosystem
model that assumes there exists a population of discrete,
interacting agents—species, people, perhaps social animals—and the individual elements of the system are
characterized by some threshold to movement. Haldane
and May just happened to be interested in banks rather
than in any of these zoological phenomena—their
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species to climatic events or the incidence of certain
animal behavior observed in the lab or the field (e.g.,
Ormerod, 1998, 2006; Michie, 2006; Long, 2009; Willis
et al., 2009). Often faced with measurements of one
state variable—algae population, stock price, observed
incidences of an animal behavior—plotted over time,
researchers are often motivated to squeeze as much out
of these time series as possible. Recently, Scheffer et al.
(2009) reviewed the tools applicable to time-series data
in identifying signals that might predate a tipping point.
In their review, tipping point refers to the point in time
when a system (a) jumps abruptly to a new steady state,
(b) bifurcates into a pattern of oscillation between attractor states, or (c) transitions into chaotic behavior
(Scheffer et al. 2009; see also Lamberson and Page,
2012). For any given time series of events, the critical
tools that Scheffer et al. (2009) identify include
1. A critical slowing down, where the response time
to an external perturbation takes longer and longer to
return to the steady state, the tipping point being when it
ultimately never returns;
2. An increasing range and significance of the autocorrelation within the time series, the simplest form of
which is the degree to which the state at time t-1 predicts
the state at time t;
3. A skewness in the response, such that the magnitude and response time in one direction (increase or
decrease in the parameter describing the system) is
much longer than those in the other direction. This signals that the basin of attraction is asymmetrical and that
the system may soon “roll off” in the direction away
from the current attractor; and
4. A flickering between discrete values of the system
parameter, signaling that the system may already have
reached bifurcation.
In principle, these criteria can be applied to time series representing a large range of systems of interacting
elements.
Before considering animal systems, it might be helpful to first consider how these tools were used for analyzing other systems. Dakos and colleagues (2008), for
example, showed how a critical slowing down in time
series of climate-proxy data preceded eight different
abrupt climate changes in the Earth’s history. In ecology,
a time series of population size was shown to foreshadow a critical transition in extinction equilibrium
through pronounced autocorrelation, increased skewness, and a critical slowing down (Drake and Griffen,
2010). The human system most often compared metaphorically to an animal herd is the stock market. Aside
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lanches of change. One can see that lowering the
threshold brings the system into this region, where there
is a middle range of interconnectivity (the point at
which the shaded region is fattest).
In the abstract, this space of potential cascades,
which is dependent on interconnections versus individual thresholds to change, is the same as that yielded by
a model of information cascades across a network of
social agents. Watts (2002) modeled social agents as
being capable of a binary decision—adopt or not adopt
a behavior. We know that different behaviors diffuse
through chimpanzee groups, for example (Whiten and
Mesoudi, 2008), so this kind of analysis may be applicable to the recognition of chimpanzee “cultures” across
geographic regions (Whiten et al., 1999).
Watts’s (2002) model was based on a classic experiment in social conformity (Asch, 1955), where each
agent in the network had a threshold of the fraction of
neighboring agents (in a random network with mean of
k connections per agent) that had to adopt an idea before
he would adopt it. Each time an agent switched, this
changed the friends’ circle for its surrounding agents
and might cause one of them to switch, and so on, percolating through the “vulnerable cluster” of agents
(Watts, 2002). In running the model over the range of
parameter values, Watts produced a map of cascade potential (Fig. 2b) that was quite similar to the model of
bank-failure cascades presented by Haldane and May
(2011).
These ecosystem models, and their generality, are
closely related to a family of models from the 1990s that
considered evolution as being analogous to highly interconnected physical systems (sand piles and forest

Fig. 2 The model of Haldane and May (2011), showing the combination of factors (average net worth of banks versus interconnections per bank) where the “ecosystem” of banks is susceptible to a sweeping cascade of failure (left-handed). The
model of Watts (2002), showing the same region of susceptibility of cascades, but in this case the tipping point leads to an
innovation sweeping across a social network (right-handed).
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“ecosystem” featured banks as the species, interbank
loans as their interconnections, and cash reserves as the
threshold to a bank’s extinction. This system was prone
to mass extinctions. If a bank’s cash reserves fell below
zero, then it failed, which meant that any banks dependent on it for interbank loans were suddenly cut off,
such that they might fail, and so on. Clearly, the closer
to the bone that the banks operated, with just a sliver of
cash assets above their liabilities, the higher the risk of
failure and the more prone the modeled system was to
catastrophic failure.
The general lesson here is to consider systems in
terms of interconnections and thresholds to change
rather than in terms of the details of individual agents.
In other words, interconnections and thresholds are what
should be studied more intensively in terms of the distribution of each measure per agent. Do all agents have
the same number of connections and the same threshold
to change, or are they distributed normally or in a nonGaussian manner? Do the distributions change over
time? These kinds of information are labor-intensive to
collect in the field, in terms of observing animal interactions, but the recognition of the kinds of data needed
could lead to a radical change in collection strategies.
Haldane and May’s (2011) model also reveals, less
intuitively, that the degree of interconnection between
agents also affects the resilience of a system. This can
be seen in a plot of the space of possibilities, with the
average threshold on the x-axis and the average number
of interconnections per agent (assumed to be normally
distributed) on the y-axis. In Fig. 2a, the shaded area
indicates the space in which the banking system of
Haldane and May is prone to system-sweeping ava-
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2009).

6 Distributions
One signature of Kauffman’s model was a highly
right-skewed distribution in the range of possible chain
reactions, from the majority of very small changes to the
minority of catastrophically large avalanches. In the
1990s, distributions were at the center of a debate about
the evolutionary process that creates distributions of
cascade sizes and durations (e.g., Sneppen et al., 1995;
Newman, 1996, 1997; Paczuski et al., 1996; Solé and
Manubria, 1996; Kirchner and Weil, 1998; Newman and
Eble, 1999a, 1999b). Different explanations for the distributions provide multiple testable hypotheses that can
be compared against real data, such as the distribution
of branch lengths of a phylogenetic tree (Burlando,
1990; Bak and Boettcher, 1997). By comparing a range
of different distributions (exponential, Weibull,
log-normal, almost power law), Venditti et al. (2010)
discovered that the branch lengths of fossil evolutionary
trees are often distributed by an exponential function.
The new complexity science highlighted the question
of whether events in a time series (such as a fossil record) were caused independently, by extreme external
events, or possibly through the vast tangle of interconnections, such that a small event could trigger a cascade.
Making Kauffman’s model even more simple, Sneppen
et al. (1995) modeled their “ecosystem” as the arrangement of index numbers (“species”) in a circle, such that

Fig. 3 In the Sneppen et al. (1995) model (after Paczuski et al., 1996), as shown at left, agents are arranged in a circle and
assigned fitness (“barrier”) values between 0 and 1. Then, at each time step in the simulation, the smallest fitness, together
with the fitness of the two neighbors, are each replaced with new random fitness values. This step is repeated again and
again. On the right is a “snapshot” of agent fitness during the critical state. The x-axis shows the agents’ positions on the
circle, and the y-axis shows their fitness at a single time step. Note that almost all agents have fitness values above a
self-organized threshold of 0.667, but a coevolutionary avalanche is occurring among the species at around x = 120.
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fires were common models), where small changes could,
once in a while, trigger massive avalanches of change.
Both could be described, in the words of the day, as
“self-organized critical” systems (Bak et al., 1987),
precariously balanced between the building up of interdependencies. As with the addition of a grain of sand to
the sand pile, the extinction of a single species could
cause the extinction of other species that were ecologically dependent on it (Sneppen et al., 1995; Paczuski et
al., 1996; Solé and Manubria, 1996).
As often happens in science, one aspect of the thinking gets selected and others get left behind. We think it
is worthwhile to revisit the thinking of Stuart Kauffman
(1993, 1995), who in his now-classic modeling of a
system of interacting agents revitalized Sewall Wright’s
1930s concept of the fitness landscape undergoing constant change, which Kauffman called “dynamic” fitness
landscapes. Kauffman showed that if agents are connected only moderately, then by adjusting their strategies accordingly, agents can all adapt fairly easily.
However, as things become more interconnected, agents
must choose either to make small adjustments to optimize their current strategy or undertake major, risky
changes in order to seek a better long-term strategy.
When the network is completely interconnected, highly
favorable strategies may be impossible to locate. This
“hill-climbing” approach has now been effective in understanding how animals as cognitively limited as
sticklebacks adapt collectively (e.g., Kendal et al.,
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distributions of frequency among all the different possible behavior within any given time period.

7 Applications to Current Zoology
Analytical emphasis on models of human collective
behavior could justify substantial changes in how information is collected in zoological fieldwork, particularly for social animals. A behavior can thus be observed
among individuals but also depicted among a network
of individuals. In animal social-diffusion experiments
(e.g., Whiten and Mesoudi, 2008), is the assumption that
the behavior can be copied between any two individuals,
or is there a network involved? And if the network is not
practicably observable, can the emergent patterns such
as the distributions of cascade sizes perhaps be used to
infer how events were interconnected (Venditti et al.,
2010)? Can certain groups be characterized as nearer to
a tipping point based on observations of network density,
time series of behavioral events, distribution of frequency of behaviors, or a sustained increase in the variance of a behavior (Carpenter and Brock, 2006)? These
questions could be explored through new ways of collecting and thinking about data on social animal behavior.
We therefore suggest three tools might be brought to
bear: 1. Simple time series analysis as advocated by
Scheffer et al. (2009); 2. Study of distributions resurrected by Venditti et al. (2010); and 3. Explicit consideration of interconnections and thresholds: may require
different field information-collection strategies.
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